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Alpine issues OpenSSH password authentication bypass advisory and requires restarting sshd after upgrade
An Alpine Linux security advisory says openssh-server under specific configurations has a password authentication bypass: an attacker only needs network access to the SSH port, knowledge of a passwordless account name, and a password between 257 and 1024 bytes long to potentially log in. Officials recommend upgrading immediately and restarting sshd, or disabling password login.
Affected conditions include running Alpine’s openssh-server built without PAM, or running openssh-server-pam with UsePAM set to no; PasswordAuthentication set to yes; the system having an account whose password field is *; and at least one local account using a $5$ or $6$ password hash. The advisory says that as long as one user has a password set, every passwordless account may become exploitable.
Potentially exploitable accounts include root with the default root:* in Alpine base images, key-only users created with adduser and without a password, users introduced through directory services without shadow entries, and the alpine user in the official tiny-cloud image. However, root is also protected by the default PermitRootLogin prohibit-password setting and can be reached directly only if root login is explicitly allowed.
Affected versions listed in the advisory include the checked Alpine 3.21 through 3.24 and edge, as well as 3.16 through 3.20, which no longer receive regular updates. Fixed versions are included in 3.21.10, 3.22.8, 3.23.8, and 3.24.4. Officials emphasize that upgrading the package will not replace the running daemon, so sshd must be restarted; if upgrading is not immediately possible, users should set PasswordAuthentication no and restart it after confirming that key-based login works.